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 Over the course of the 20th century, the political ideology of communism spread 
throughout Eastern Europe. The successive early 20th century leadership of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR)–prominently being Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev–all used 
communism to enforce governance and safeguard against national demise. Soviet socialism, 
founded on Marxist communism, soon departed from its Marxist foundation and morphed into a 
party-state that contradicted the very principles of communist ideology. Throughout the Cold 
War, this modified communism stood as the hallmark of the Soviet Union– one that separated US 
allies from Russian allies. However, late 20th century USSR, largely due to the influence of 
Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), fell 
away from socialism and instead turned to capitalism and a more democratic form of leadership. 
Influencing communist Russia through his more liberal policies of glasnost and perestroika, 
Mikhail Gorbachev upset the balance of Russian politics and threatened military power by 
weakening the control and influence of the CPSU. As a result of this power struggle, a coup 
ensued on August 21, 1991 and the Soviet Union collapsed shortly after. Due to the Soviets’ 
creation of a socialist party-state that contradicted Marxist ideology, Gorbachev’s liberalizing 
attempts to democratize the union through his policies of glasnost and perestroika proved 
incompatible with the continuation of Soviet governance, and thus led to the downfall of the 
Soviet regime.  
 The Soviet Union formally came into being on January 1st, 1924. Founded on the basis 
of communism rather than nationality, the coalition of republics eventually grew to incorporate 
many Eastern European countries.  Uprisings headed by Vladimir Lenin in 1917 against the 1
 Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Place Names, 6th ed. (2020), s.v. “Soviet Union.” 1
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post-Tsar government ended with the nationalization and redistribution of private industry and 
agriculture. Finding inspiration in Marxist communism for his Revolution, Lenin carried a 
revolutionary form of communism with him to his later tenure as Soviet Premier. Communism is 
a political ideology that argues for a classless, state-less society, in which there is no private 
property: all means of production are controlled by the proletariat (the working class), and each 
person gets payed according to their ability and needs.  Solidified by victory after the Russian 2
civil war, revolutionary communism soon became a permanent Eastern European ideology, and 
the foundation for the Soviet Union’s governance. Under Soviet Premier Lenin’s leadership, the 
communism of the USSR turned from traditional Marxist communism into Marxism-Leninism, a 
socialist ideology. Two main principles defined Marxism-Leninism: strict adherence to the party, 
and democracy only within the party. Lenin headed a dictatorship of the proletariate; a 
governance on behalf of the working class which consisted of a small, select group of what 
Lenin deemed, “elite” proletariats. However, after Lenin died, his 1924 successor, Joseph Stalin, 
changed much of Marxism-Leninism and created his own brand of socialism, which became 
known as Stalinism. Stalinism, a variant of Marxism-Leninism, had three main principles: 
dialectical materialism, a cult of personality–which spelled the end for intraparty democracy–, 
and the idea of “socialism in one country.”  Stalinism, harsh and ruthless, forced rapid 3
industrialization through violent means and caused famine and death.  Stalin’s two most notable 4
successors, Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, both started out with plans to liberalize the 
 Encyclopedia Britannica, (2017), s.v. “Communism,” https://www.britannica.com/topic/2
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USSR and depart from Stalinism, but Khrushchev left office and Brezhnev failed. The three 
leaders that directly followed Khrushchev, “stifled reform and attempted to impose a modified 
version of Stalinism.”  This love of Stalinism and aversion to reform led to decades of 5
ineffective reforms resulting in growing corruption within both the party and the Union. By the 
time Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the CPSU in 1985, the USSR was in the 
midst of an economic disaster and in dire need of reform. Gorbachev created two main policies 
of glasnost and perestroika to achieve reform. Glasnost was  “a new willingness to tolerate 
dissident opinions,” and perestroika was “the comprehensive reform of the Soviet political and 
economic system.”  Glasnost’s openness and perestroika’s restructuring became the tenets of 6
Gorbachev’s reforms. His liberal attempts to democratize the Union were met with resistance, 
and ultimately heralded the end of the Union’s adherence to socialism. 
 Soviet socialism was a contradictory, imperfect reflection of communism. Marxism-
Leninism, the communism of the Union, was actually socialism, and not socialism the way Marx 
intended. Marxist ideology called for the stage of communism to be a successor to the necessary 
development stage of capitalism, but the founder of the Union, Lenin, skipped this stage. 
Political scientist Valerie Bunce notes that, “absent from the Russian experience…was the 
development of private property…a rational bureaucracy, the rule of law, and an independent 
nobility.”  The Russians never went through the stages of social and economic development 7
 Ibid. 5
 Archie Brown, “Gorbachev, Mikhail,” in The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (2 6
ed.), (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001).
 Valerie Bunce, “The Soviet Union under Gorbachev: Ending Stalinism and Ending the Cold 7
War,” International Journal 46, no. 2 (1991): 239. doi:10.2307/40202859.
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necessary to build a communist nation; they called for a communist abolishment of private 
property in a country with not enough private property to warrant such a call. Lenin took a 
mostly feudal nation at the beginning of the 20th century and engrained into it the ideology of 
one of the most progressive, advanced ways of social organization. Western socialists began to 
refer to communism as “actually existing socialism,” but as it was enacted, it only loosely 
resembled traditional communist ideology.  The continuance of the USSR state most directly 8
contradicted Marxism.  
 An inability to fulfill certain Marxist principles led to the installment of a corrupt party-
state which set the nation up for future failure. In theory, when communism is enacted correctly, 
the state should wither away and leave in its place a state-less society, but the Soviet state could 
not die out due to pressure from outside enemies.  Its existence defied the very tenets of the 9
ideology it claimed to uphold, and led to the creation and prevalence of a party-state. Governing 
as a dictatorship of the proletariats, the CPSU represented ten percent of the working class, 
which in turn, made up only ten percent of the Soviet total population.  The contradiction 10
inherent in the existence of a socialist state, coupled with the presence of a dictatorship of a 
minority, required the CPSU to become a partocracy to stay in power. When Lenin abolished 
private property, the state seized and centrally managed all productive property, which, “…
 George W. Breslauer, “Gorbachev on the Political Defensive,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of 8
the Social Sciences, (Berkeley: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
 Vladimir Bukovsky, “Will Gorbachev Reform the Soviet Union?” Commentary 3, no. 82 9
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resulted in oligarchic and bureaucratic rule by the party, rather than by members of society.”  11
The party managed everything, from a planned economy in the economic sphere and one-party 
intraparty democracy in the political sphere, to eventually no democracy at all, not even within 
the party. The nation needed the party in order to function. From the moment of its inception, the 
CPSU ran the government to such a degree that there emerged two separate governments: the 
actual Soviet government, and a separate “shadow government” that ran the actual government 
and consisted of party members.  This double-structured form of governance became bigger and 12
more powerful under Stalin. Soviet socialism, because of its deviation from Marxist communism 
into an all powerful, two-tiered partocracy, set the nation up for failure in later decades.  
 In action, the Soviet regime’s party-state necessitated reform due to its corruption and 
ineffectiveness. The double-structured nature of government, existing permanently in a state of 
conflict between Soviet interests and socialist interests, and powered by the CPSU’s ability to 
grant and deny power and positions without opposition, was almost impossible to reform. 
Members of government constantly had to compete with incompetent, but more powerful, party 
members. Specialist workers who knew how to complete their government jobs efficiently were 
overseen by less competent, less educated, proletariat political commissars from the CPSU, 
which bred resentment between government workers and party members.  Stalin, by giving the 13
party more autonomy, placed the party’s interests above those of the economy. Khrushchev, 
Stalin’s successor, tried to place the economy before party, but he was ousted for upsetting the 
 Breslauer, “Gorbachev on the Political Defensive.”11
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status quo, and never succeeded. Brezhnev, Khrushchev’s successor, started out with plans to 
liberalize, but ended up contributing most heavily to an increase in party corruption and 
economic turmoil.  His Brezhnev doctrine, especially, led to inadequate attempts at reformation, 14
and party corruption that in turn, led to a loss of party control.  Brezhnev set the stage for 15
Gorbachev’s tenure in office by breeding corruption and ending in economic crisis, and 
correspondingly, Gorbachev inherited a corrupt, ineffective party-state in the process of losing 
control.  The present economic crisis resulted from an ambitious foreign policy and the failure 16
of Russia to undergo the developmental stages it skipped in its hurry to communism. In addition 
to this chaos Gorbachev found when he assumed office, the USSR’s state socialism created such 
a dependence of the Soviet citizenry on their leaders that major reform could only come from 
above, from the leaders themselves.  It was this pressure to “reform from above”, caused by a 17
contradictory state socialism, that forced Gorbachev to reform the Union.  Thus, due to the 18
actions of past leaders, Mikhail Gorbachev was in no position to refuse reform when he took 
office as General Secretary in 1985. 
 Gorbachev created reforms with the interest of the USSR in mind. Prior to Gorbachev, 
the USSR had three goals guiding it: economic and political-military competition with the West, 
 Valerie Bunce, “Domestic Reform and International Change: the Gorbachev Reforms in 14
Historical Perspective,” International Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): 113. www.jstor.org/stable/
2706884.
 Bunce, “The Soviet Union under Gorbachev: Ending Stalinism and Ending the Cold War,” 15
224.
 Bunce, “The Soviet Union under Gorbachev,” 224. 16
 Bunce, “Domestic Reform and International Change: the Gorbachev Reforms in Historical 17
Perspective,” 118.
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a commitment to expanding the site and strength of the world socialist system, and isolation from 
the global capitalist economy.  Following these goals created the crisis Gorbachev found 19
himself in, one caused directly by bad government and an inefficient economy. Gorbachev knew 
well the flaws of the communist collective.  To amend the crisis, Gorbachev’s agenda of reform 20
consisted of making both government and economy more efficient.  He introduced his policies 21
of glasnost and perestroika in 1985.  Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost loosened the CPSU’s hold 22
on mainstream political thought by allowing new parties, dissenting views, and criticisms to be 
brought forward. Perestroika focused on deregulating and restructuring economics and politics. 
This included trying to fix the economic disarray handed to him by shifting from a command 
economy to a marketized, demand economy.  Perestroika, allowing for structural changes in the 23
economy, enabled the beginning of capitalist markets and political reforms, like the creation of a 
new national legislature. In action, glasnost seemed to be quite liberating. It lifted many 
government restrictions on the press, and allowed for open criticism of the government and of 
government-sanctioned history. Under glasnost, Stalinism was condemned,  and there emerged 24
 Ibid. 19
 “Gorbachev, Mikhail (1931–),” in Encyclopedia of United States National Security (Thousand 20
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2005).
 Bunce, “Domestic Reform and International Change,” 119.21
 “End of the Soviet Union; Gorbachev's Six Tumultuous Years at Soviet Helm: [Chronology],” 22
New York Times, Dec 26, 1991, http://stats.lib.pdx.edu/proxy.php?url=http://
search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.pdx.edu/newspapers/end-soviet-union-gorbachevs-six-
tumultuous-years/docview/428307360/se-2?accountid=13265.
 “Perestroika," in Encyclopedia of United States National Security (Thousand Oaks, CA: 23
SAGE Publications, Inc., 2005).
 “Glasnost,” in Encyclopedia of United States National Security (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 24
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a significant liberalization of politics.  Initially, glasnost and perestroika worked well together, 25
because as Soviets became more vocal, calls for democracy increased, which led to 
restructuring.  In 1987, the Communist Party Central Planning Committee approved 26
Gorbachev’s plan to allow voters to choose candidates in local elections, and by 1989, the first 
free elections in over seventy years were held for the Congress of People’s Deputies, the new 
national legislature.  In addition to increased democracy, perestroika relaxed trade restrictions, 27
encouraged Western investment, and in 1988, allowed for the creation of limited co-operative 
business, which shifted many businesses to privatization.  In a more extreme reform, perestroika 28
became the cause for talks of decentralization of the Soviet bloc, and for a potential coalition 
government. Perestroika and glasnost fundamentally changed the Soviet Union.  
 However, despite Gorbachev’s best interests, the reforms failed to do what he intended. 
Glasnost and perestroika, though seemingly a symbiotic relationship, were incompatible with 
each other.  The CPSU, and by extension state socialism, relied on unquestioning obedience that 29
disappeared under glasnost. In contrast, perestroika was a restructuring of state socialism and of 
the CPSU, and thus, needed the power and authority of the CPSU to work. Glasnost threatened 
 Bunce, “Domestic Reform and International Change,” 123.25
 Bunce, “Domestic Reform and International Change,” 124.26
 “End of the Soviet Union; Gorbachev's Six Tumultuous Years at Soviet Helm: [Chronology],” 27
New York Times.
 “Perestroika,” History.com, 14 Apr. 2010, www.history.com/topics/cold-war/perestroika-and-28
glasnost.
 Serge Schmemann, “End of the Soviet Union; the Soviet State, Born of a Dream, Dies,” New 29




party control, and perestroika could not exist or function without party control. In previous 
decades, under previous leadership, opposition would have been met harshly, but under 
perestroika and glasnost, the lobbies opposing Gorbachev’s reforms–the military-industrial 
complex, the fuel-energy complex, and the agroindustrial complex–did not fear backlash, and 
resisted openly because of it.  Gorbachev reformed away his own influence, because by 30
restructuring the USSR, he broke the systems giving him power. The more he reformed, the less 
influence he had to combat opposition. In allowing opposition to exist, glasnost attacked the 
ability of the USSR to govern. The power of the USSR of old lay in Stalinism, and glasnost 
condemned Stalinism; by attacking Stalinism, Gorbachev’s policies hacked away at the bedrock 
of the nation. However, apart from the inability of glasnost and perestroika to work together, the 
reforms were generally ineffective, in part because of pushback from all sides. Perestroika had 
many consequences: shortages of goods, decline in civic order, and the eruption of ethnic 
rivalries. Perestroika’s measures teetered constantly between being too weak, or too grand. When 
large changes succeeded, they usually had bad consequences, such as inflation.  Reforms were 31
criticized by the far right for being too radical, and by the left for taking too long and not being 
radical enough. Communist hard-liners tried to hold on to what power and influence they had, 
and radical reformers wanted to change the direction and pace of change. Opposition mounted, 
towards both the CPSU and the reforms. In the early months of 1991, strikes occurred frequently, 
forcing the government to grant some concessions, even outside of the CPSU. Boris Yeltsin, the 
president of Russia, granted striking miners the freedom of selling twenty percent of their profits 
 Mark Harrison, review of The Struggle to Save the Soviet Economy: Mikhail Gorbachev and 30
the Collapse of the USSR, by Chris Miller, https://doi-org.proxy.lib.pdx.edu/10.1086/698810.
 “Perestroika," in Encyclopedia of United States National Security.31
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on the free market. Other workers began wanting to sell their output for dollars.  This increase 32
in preference for a free market economy threatened party control over foreign-currency earnings, 
a main source of the party’s power.  The proletariat, in whose name the CPSU governed, 33
became dissatisfied and wanted the party removed from the workplace entirely.  A full 1.8 34
million members left the party in 1990, which dealt a hard blow to the party’s influence. A poll in 
Kaliningrad in 1991 showed that sixty-two percent of local party members were indifferent to its 
policies, and only eight percent trusted the party without any reservation.  The party itself, in 35
addition to the Soviet strikers and protesters, called for Gorbachev’s resignation as party leader 
in an April 24th, 1991 party meeting, over opposition to a coalition government, and in blame for 
the economy. The backlash against reforms lessened party power significantly.  
 The undermining impact of Gorbachev’s contradictory, ineffective reforms on the CPSU 
subsequently meant a loss of party control over the military. By 1991, the party had ceased to be 
a party in any ideological sense, instead clinging to its last vestiges of influence by remaining a 
source of power and privilege for its members.  The Soviet military provided the CPSU its final 36
authority. The party depended more on the military-industrial complex for its power than on its 
members, and a looming break between the military and the party signaled an end the party’s 
 “Gorbachev Bends to Survive,” The Economist 319, no. 7704 (27 Apr. 1991). link.gale.com/32
apps/doc/A10657095/PROF?u=s1185784&amp;sid=PROF&amp;xid=a64c69dd.
 “Gorbachev Bends to Survive,” The Economist. 33
 D. Stanglin and J. Corwin, “Communism's New Deal,” U.S. News & World Report 111, no. 5 34
(July 29, 1991): 28. http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.pdx.edu/login.aspx?
direct=true&db=aph&AN=9107291497&site=ehost-live.
 D. Stanglin and J. Corwin, “Communism's New Deal,” U.S. News & World Report.35
 Ibid.36
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security in this sense. In a survey conducted in 1991, more than sixty percent of midlevel officers 
wanted to remove the military from the party’s influence.  As the party lost support and 37
splintered, its hold on the military dwindled.  
 The final days of the Soviet Union point to Gorbachev’s reforms being the catalyst of the 
coup, and thus, ultimately the end of the Soviet Union. In charge of a party split between support 
for, and opposition against, a decentralized government, Gorbachev could not win everybody’s 
support. In March of 1991, a nationwide referendum voted to support Gorbachev’s plan for a 
looser union, but six republics boycotted the vote, and anti-Kremlin initiatives took hold in many 
other republics.  The democracy encouraged by glasnost translated to a lessening of unity but, 38
nonetheless, July of that year heralded a draft of a new union treaty. The treaty gave an 
unprecedented amount of federal power to the republics, and came close to creating a 
federation.  Gorbachev’s support of the treaty pointed towards more decentralization of power, 39
and the military did not want power to be decentralized any further than it already was. To 
prevent further centralization of power, the Soviet army, KGB, Ministry of Interior, and the rest 
of the military industry undertook a coup from August 18th to August 21st.  President Yeltsin 40
condemned the coup and led successful, peaceful resistance efforts,  but the damage had already 41
been done. Party authority finally broke. A few months later, “measured against its own 
 Ibid.37
 “End of the Soviet Union; Gorbachev's Six Tumultuous Years at Soviet Helm: [Chronology],” 38
New York Times.
 “Gorbachev, Mikhail (1931–),” in Encyclopedia of United States National Security.39
 “Gorbachev, Mikhail (1931–),” in Encyclopedia of United States National Security.40
 “End of the Soviet Union; Gorbachev's Six Tumultuous Years at Soviet Helm: [Chronology],” 41
New York Times.
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ambitions, the USSR died a monumental failure.”  Built on the grandest of ideologies, but on 42
the shakiest of foundations, the Soviet Union dissolved on December 25th, 1991.   43
 The Soviet Union could not be reformed. Reforming the Union to align with Gorbachev’s 
goals led, in the end, to a transformation of the Union into a different entity, one no longer in 
accordance with its communist beginnings. The USSR’s state socialism required so many 
reforms to function efficiently without corruption that it changed entirely. Through his reforms, 
Gorbachev found himself trying to reform away the very essence of the USSR, and in the end he 
succeeded. Once perestroika got close to restructuring the state, glasnost swept in and dissolved 
the blind party obedience perestroika needed to build structure around. Glasnost and perestroika, 
though in conflict with each other, deeply conflicted with a state whose governance depended on 
an aversion to openness, and an inability to restructure itself. If the Soviets had not instituted 
state socialism, there would have been no state in need of restructuring, no state in need of 
liberalization or democratic efforts. Gorbachev’s reforms were doomed from the start, because 
there can be no reformation of a state built on contradiction and double-structured power 
struggles without overturning the state. In the end, however, though state socialism could not 
have survived much longer, it was Gorbachev’s restructuring of the party and of government, in 
tandem with his openness to criticism, that enabled the military to rise up in a coup and thus, end 
the Union. The short lived, abruptly ended, existence of the Soviet Union points towards larger 
implications of the impossibility of a stateless society to exist in the modern world, where it will 
 Serge Schmemann, “End of the Soviet Union; the Soviet State, Born of a Dream, Dies,” New 42
York Times.
 Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Place Names, 6th ed. (2020), s.v. “Soviet Union.” 43
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always be surrounded by outside opposition presenting reasons for the continued existence of a 
state. In a post-Soviet world, perhaps openness towards dissent will always lead to democracy.  
Van Sickle 14
Bibliography 
Breslauer, George W. “Gorbachev on the Political Defensive.” In The Cambridge Dictionary of 
the Social Sciences. Berkeley: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
Brown, Archie. “Gorbachev, Mikhail.” In The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World (2 ed.), 
edited by Joel Krieger. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Bukovsky, Vladimir. “Will Gorbachev Reform the Soviet Union?” Commentary 3, no. 82 
(September 1986): 19–24. http://stats.lib.pdx.edu/proxy.php?
Bunce, Valerie. “Domestic Reform and International Change: the Gorbachev Reforms in 
Historical Perspective.” International Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): 107–138. 
www.jstor.org/stable/2706884. 
Bunce, Valerie. “The Soviet Union under Gorbachev: Ending Stalinism and Ending the Cold 
War.” International Journal 46, no. 2 (1991): 220-241. doi:10.2307/40202859.
“End of the Soviet Union; Gorbachev's Six Tumultuous Years at Soviet Helm: [Chronology].”
New York Times, Dec 26, 1991. http://stats.lib.pdx.edu/proxy.php?url=http://
search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.pdx.edu/newspapers/end-soviet-union-gorbachevs-six-
tumultuous-years/docview/428307360/se-2?accountid=13265.
“Gorbachev Bends to Survive.” The Economist 319, no. 7704 (27 Apr. 1991). Gale OneFile: 
Educator's Reference Complete, link.gale.com/apps/doc/A10657095/PROF?
u=s1185784&amp;sid=PROF&amp;xid=a64c69dd. 
“Gorbachev, Mikhail (1931–).” In Encyclopedia of United States National Security, edited by 
Samuels, Richard J., 298-99. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2005. http://
dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.pdx.edu/10.4135/9781412952446.n235
“Glasnost.” In Encyclopedia of United States National Security, edited by Samuels, Richard J., 
291-92. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2005. http://
dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.pdx.edu/10.4135/9781412952446.n230
“Perestroika.” In Encyclopedia of United States National Security, edited by Samuels, Richard J., 
580-580. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2005. http://
dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.pdx.edu/10.4135/9781412952446.n464.
Stanglin, D., and J. Corwin. “Communism's New Deal.” U.S. News & World Report 111, no. 5 
(July 29, 1991): 28.  http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.pdx.edu/login.aspx?
direct=true&db=aph&AN=9107291497&site=ehost-live.
Schmemann, Serge. “End of the Soviet Union; the Soviet State, Born of a Dream, Dies.” New 
York Times, Dec 26, 1991. http://stats.lib.pdx.edu/proxy.php?url=http://
Van Sickle 15
search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.pdx.edu/newspapers/end-soviet-union-state-born-dream-
dies/docview/428301838/se-2?accountid=13265.
